Developing Nations Rally Behind Two-Tier Transition at Antalya COP31

ANTALYA, Nov 12 – TWN: (Hilary Kung)  Developing nations have united behind a proposal to establish a two-tier governance structure for the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM), arguing that the framework must pair a Party-driven political body with a dedicated technical and implementation-support arm to deliver practical assistance to the Global South.

Speaking on November 10 during the opening session of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) contact group at the ongoing COP31 climate negotiations in Antalya, the Group of 77 (G77) and China laid out their foundational vision. The coalition asserted that the JTM must combine a Party-driven policy tier with an implementation-support tier—a structural blueprint strongly echoed by developing country sub-groups across the negotiating floor.

Co-chaired by Federica Fricano of Italy and Joseph Teo of Singapore, the contact group opened with a three-part roadmap: operationalising the JTM, reviewing the JTWP, and implementing the work programme by agreeing on key messages from its fifth and sixth dialogues.

Delivering the intervention for the G77 and China, Egypt urged Parties to agree in Antalya on the JTM’s core functions and architecture, while mandating work in 2027 to finalize detailed operational arrangements and rules of procedure. Egypt emphasized that the JTM must support developing countries in executing nationally determined just transition pathways aligned with sustainable development and poverty eradication. Crucially, the bloc stressed that facilitating technical assistance, capacity-building, and technology access must complement—and never substitute for—developed countries’ legal obligations to provide means of implementation, free from external conditionalities.

Regional coalitions quickly fleshed out this governance model:

• AILAC (Chile): Called for a political tier to provide oversight and host annual dialogues, alongside a secretariat-backed support tier to coordinate bodies under paragraph 25 of decision 2/CMA.7. Viewing the JTM as the "next phase" of the JTWP, AILAC proposed keeping the work programme active for up to two years as an institutional bridge before reallocating its core budget to the operational JTM.

• African Group (Ghana): Announced plans to table a consolidated text, expecting COP31 to decide the JTM's architecture and timeline for full operationalisation by the next CMA in Addis Ababa. Ghana stressed that the mechanism must help developing economies add value to domestic resources and assist local industries and informal workers in meeting international standards without facing unilateral trade barriers. Reaffirming developed nations' finance obligations under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, Ghana warned that "a just transition without means of implementation is not a just transition."

• AOSIS (Fiji): Proposed a constituted steering committee under the policy tier to draft a rolling five-year workplan, featuring dedicated seats for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and civil society observers. Its technical tier would draw on experts from Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and the Global South, building on existing readiness support and linking to the financial mechanism without duplication.

• LDCs (Ethiopia): Aligned with the African Group, insisting the JTM address structural inequalities in clean energy access, poverty, high debt burdens, and limited fiscal space, while retaining the JTWP as a parallel forum for dialogue.

• LLDCs (Botswana) and the Arab Group (Qatar): Both backed the two-tier model. Botswana called for recognizing the unique constraints of landlocked nations and cautioned that not all just transition needs can be turned into bankable projects, while Qatar warned against top-down prescriptive guidance.

Speaking for the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), Saudi Arabia proposed situating the two-tier JTM under the JTWP. Under its vision, the Party-driven tier would steer the workplan and share good practices, while an advisory board under the support tier would oversee the network, catalyze demand-driven assistance, and tackle unilateral trade measures.

However, Saudi Arabia drew sharp red lines. The LMDC rejected linking the JTM to the Paris Agreement implementation cycle if it creates new reporting burdens or top-down mandates for Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs). Furthermore, Saudi Arabia rejected developed countries' use of a recent 200-page mapping report to argue against creating a new constituted body, noting that under decision 2/CMA.7, the report was strictly mandated for the JTWP review. It also opposed producing a "State of Just Transition" report, asserting that transition pathways remain strictly nationally driven, and urged developed nations to achieve emissions neutrality well before 2050.

In contrast, developed nations resisted establishing new institutional bodies, favoring integration with existing UNFCCC structures and Secretariat-led coordination:

• European Union: Emphasized that just transition enables 1.5°C-aligned climate action and called on Parties to leave Antalya with clear agreements on the JTM's mandate. The EU proposed a five-year workplan adopted at CMA9, informed by Parties and non-Party stakeholders, alongside annual in-session high-level exchanges. Citing the mapping report to show existing expertise, the EU envisioned the JTM providing guidance to other Paris Agreement workstreams and integrating transition considerations into sectoral plans aligned with BTR and Global Stocktake (GST) cycles.

• United Kingdom: Framed just transition around 1.5°C alignment, GST implementation, and "green industrialisation." Calling for COP31 operationalisation as a complete package with the JTWP serving as the political element, the UK proposed situating the JTM under the JTWP as a technical implementation hub. Pointing to existing initiatives in the mapping report—such as the NDC Partnership, ILO, and CTCN—the UK urged establishing a Secretariat-led coordination unit to boost coherence.

• Canada: Called for a single decision concluding the JTWP review and operationalising the JTM, noting that gaps stem from fragmented coordination rather than lack of capacity. Canada suggested the Secretariat perform key coordination duties, including building an online repository and knowledge hub to connect existing experts.

• Norway: Proposed anchoring the JTM in paragraph 25 of decision 2/CMA.7 through 2036, subject to a five-year review at SB69. Norway suggested mandating existing constituted bodies to execute JTM functions, supported by annual Secretariat reports, ministerial roundtables, and a "State of Just Transition" report for the GST.

• Japan and EIG (Switzerland): Japan argued that creating a new body is fiscally unrealistic amid shrinking international budgets, suggesting a facilitative role and leveraging the Mitigation Work Programme for finance. Switzerland deferred its stance on governance pending clarity on form, emphasizing a human rights approach, 1.5°C alignment, and helping countries tap existing finance rather than creating a new financial mechanism.