UN Reform: A Vital Process, Not a Funding Crisis Reaction

UN reform must be an ongoing, dynamic process—driven by internal assessment and vision, not as a knee-jerk reaction to US funding threats. A specialised unit under the Secretary-General should continuously review and recommend changes to improve structure, responsibility, efficiency, and impact. Credit: United Nations

The United Nations is once again being compelled to examine its structure and functioning under mounting pressure—primarily from its largest funder, the United States. However, this time, the rhetoric has escalated, with former US President Donald Trump having taken an aggressive stance by drastically slashing financial contributions and pulling out of multiple UN-affiliated organisations.

The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), as well as from the landmark Paris Climate Accords, was intended to send a blunt message: reform or lose support. Such moves, applauded by certain domestic factions in the US and quietly by some other donors, underscore a broader pattern—UN reform is often triggered not by strategic vision but by financial pressure.

Historically, US threats to withhold contributions have forced the hands of previous Secretaries-General—Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon both launched reform initiatives under such duress. The unfortunate implication is that the UN’s reform efforts often appear performative, enacted merely to appease donors rather than to achieve meaningful organisational transformation. Having worked within the UN system myself, I observed a pervasive cynicism: many senior staff assumed the US would eventually pay its dues and continued with business as usual.

But this time may be different. The financial pressures are sharper, and the operational stakes higher. With global crises mounting—from armed conflict to climate change—the UN must demonstrate both relevance and efficiency. It must go beyond superficial restructuring and instead commit to systemic, enduring reforms that enhance transparency, productivity, and value for money.

Encouragingly, the US, despite its criticisms, has not entirely abandoned the UN. Acting US Permanent Representative Dorothy Shea recently affirmed America’s continued belief in the UN’s mission, stating:

"The United Nations remains essential to resolving complex international challenges, first among them maintaining international peace and security... The Secretary-General is uniquely positioned to lead this endeavour."

This statement, while supportive, comes with a clear caveat: the UN must return to its principal purpose and improve delivery, particularly at the country level.

A core issue lies in mandate overreach. Over the years, the UN has taken on a wide range of tasks—often initiated by Member States to align with their domestic political interests. While many of these tasks, such as in human rights and climate change, fall broadly within the UN’s charter, critics argue they dilute focus and drain limited resources.

Today, this mission sprawl is exacerbated by chronic underfunding. As of April 30, 2025, Member States owed the UN $2.4 billion in unpaid assessments. The United States alone owed $1.5 billion, followed by China at $600 million, and Russia at over $70 million. Compounding this, the peacekeeping budget was in arrears by $2.7 billion. In 2024, 41 countries failed to meet their contribution obligations. Though the loss of voting rights looms as a penalty, it has rarely been enforced with meaningful impact.

Recognising the need for structural change, UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched the "UN80" review process in March 2025—an effort to ensure the organisation remains “fit-for-purpose” ahead of its 80th anniversary. But will this exercise be any more effective than those of his predecessors? Time will tell.

For reform to succeed, the UN must treat it not as a temporary fix but as a continuous imperative. The Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC) and the UN General Assembly's Fifth Committee already contribute to oversight, but both remain vulnerable to Member State pressure and politicisation.

A dedicated reform unit reporting directly to the Secretary-General should be empowered to evaluate every component of the organisation, recommend realignments, and enforce accountability. Managers must embody the values of modern leadership: technical expertise, a commitment to innovation, and a drive to achieve results. Moreover, appointments—especially at the senior-most levels—must be based on proven management capabilities, not political expediency.

Training and upskilling must be institutionalised, not sporadic. I recall how, under Kofi Annan, initiatives such as the UN21 Pin for exceptional performance encouraged a performance culture, while team-building retreats, like those at Glen Cove, fostered collaborative leadership. Yet, many such efforts faltered due to a disconnect between reformers and politically appointed outsiders unfamiliar with the inner workings of the organisation.

Structural reforms should also include rationalising overlapping mandates. Bodies such as ECOSOC, its functional commissions, and GA’s Second and Third Committees often duplicate effort and compete for relevance. An internal review mechanism must be established to identify and eliminate such redundancies.

Leadership bloat also requires urgent attention. The need for all current Under-Secretaries-General (USG), Assistant Secretaries-General (ASG), and Directors (D) should be scrutinised. Many roles could be consolidated, others eliminated. Reform cannot succeed without rigour in implementation.

The UN’s reliance on expensive, in-person meetings—often in New York or Geneva—should also be reconsidered. Modern technology allows for remote participation, reducing costs and increasing accessibility, especially for delegations from developing countries. This was effectively trialled during the COVID-19 lockdowns.

Additionally, the relocation of some UN offices to more cost-effective regions should be seriously considered. Nairobi already hosts UNEP and UN-Habitat; Jamaica could become a hub for ocean-related agencies; Bonn, home to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), could house marine and climate-related units under one roof—promoting synergy and cutting expenses.

Even flagship entities like UNDP and UNICEF could be evaluated for relocation away from high-cost centres like New York. The symbolic value of headquarters must not overshadow operational efficiency.

Ultimately, the UN must not only change structurally but also culturally. It must become a results-driven organisation, grounded in its founding principles yet agile enough to respond to 21st-century challenges. Reform must be permanent, participatory, and protected from the political whims of dominant Member States.

If not, the latest wave of reform, like so many before it, will fizzle into bureaucratic inertia—another missed opportunity for the world’s preeminent multilateral institution to live up to its potential.