
Monitoring Iran and promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The decision earlier this week by the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) to initiate the process to snap back UN sanctions on Iran—originally modified under the 2015 nuclear deal—must be paired with an effective diplomatic strategy that restarts talks between the United States and Iran.
If the E3 and the United States fail to prioritise pragmatic diplomacy in the coming weeks and provide assurances that there will be no further military attacks while bilateral talks proceed, they risk pushing Tehran closer to nuclear weapons and placing the region back on a path to conflict.
Under the so-called snapback process outlined in Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 nuclear deal, the Security Council now has 30 days to pass a resolution continuing UN sanctions relief. If such a resolution does not pass, UN sanctions and nuclear restrictions—including a prohibition on uranium enrichment imposed between 2006 and 2010—would be automatically reinstated. These earlier resolutions were part of the global pressure campaign that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Iran has threatened to respond to the reimposition of UN measures, including by withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—a step that could escalate tensions with the United States.
To avert this crisis, the Trump administration must use the 30-day window before snapback is finalised to reach an interim agreement with Iran. Such an arrangement would stabilise the current situation, reduce the risk of conflict, and provide the time and space necessary for comprehensive nuclear negotiations.
Any interim agreement must prioritise the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi’s announcement that inspectors have returned to Iran, and Tehran’s decision to allow access to the Bushehr site, is a positive step. However, Iran must meet its legal obligations by permitting full IAEA safeguards inspections at all sites and cooperating with efforts to account for uranium enriched to near-weapons-grade levels.
The agreement should also address Iran’s concerns over illegal attacks on its nuclear facilities and scientists, solidify the ceasefire that ended the 12-day conflict involving Israel, Iran, and the United States, and recognise Iran’s NPT rights to a peaceful nuclear program under IAEA safeguards.
While insufficient to fully resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis, such an agreement would de-escalate tensions and create time for further diplomacy to reduce Iran’s proliferation risk. Failure to act during this window could drive Tehran closer to nuclear weapons, weaken the NPT, and increase the risk of military conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran.
Despite claims that US and Israeli strikes set back Iran’s nuclear program, military action cannot fully address Iran’s nuclear knowledge or material. Significant capabilities remain unmonitored, allowing Tehran to return quickly to the threshold of nuclear weapons if it chooses.
If the United States fails to seize this diplomatic opportunity, it risks conflict escalation and weakening the global nonproliferation framework. A lasting diplomatic solution that verifiably blocks Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons while providing benefits in return remains the most viable path forward.
The Arms Control Association, an independent, nonpartisan organisation, provides authoritative information and practical solutions to eliminate the threats posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons. Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, is a leading expert on nuclear and missile programs in Iran and North Korea and on international nonproliferation efforts.