Trump Unveils Gaza Peace Plan: Promise or Illusion?

Image: The White House 29.9.25

Back in January last year, my Toda Policy Brief No. 182 was published under the title “Israel and Gaza: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow.” On 29 September this year, President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a joint press conference to announce a new peace plan for Gaza. The plan’s title could well have been “Gaza: Today, Tomorrow and the Day After.”

Trump’s yearning for a Nobel Peace Prize is no secret, possibly driven by Obama-envy. If his bold and audacious 20-point Gaza plan succeeds, he may well deserve the award — for it envisions the end of Hamas as a governing force in Gaza and as a security threat to Israel, offers regional stability for Arab states, promises a terror-free future for Israel, and keeps alive the dream of a Palestinian state. That said, there are still a few potholes on the road to Middle East peace.

First, the Good News

Any viable peace plan must deliver on three core challenges:

An immediate ceasefire ending the killings and ensuring the release of all Israeli hostages, dead or alive (today);

The removal of Hamas as a military, political, and institutional force from Gaza and its replacement with a credible governance structure to oversee reconstruction (the agenda for tomorrow); and

Credible guarantees to prevent the return of terror to Israel (the promise of the day after).

The plan calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces to an agreed line and a cessation of hostilities once all parties sign the deal; the return of all hostages to Israel within 72 hours of acceptance; and the release of 2,000 Palestinian prisoners by Israel (points 3–5).

The second section (tomorrow) spans points 6–16. After the exchange of hostages and prisoners, Hamas members who surrender will be granted amnesty and, if they wish, safe passage to third countries. They will have no role in Gaza’s governance.

Aid deliveries will resume and be distributed without interference. Gaza will be governed by a transitional, technocratic committee of qualified Palestinians and international experts. An international Peace Board will “set the framework,” “handle funding for redevelopment,” and “create modern and efficient governance” to “the best international standards.” Trump will also draw up an economic development plan.

No one will be forced to leave Gaza. Israel will neither occupy nor annex the Strip. Instead, its forces will withdraw gradually, in line with Hamas’s demilitarisation. The US, Arab countries, and other partners will provide a temporary International Stabilisation Force to deploy immediately in Gaza.

The final component (points 1, 9, 14, 19, 20) envisions Gaza as “a deradicalised, terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbours.” Arab regional partners will guarantee compliance, and the new “Board of Peace” — to be chaired by Trump himself — will oversee implementation.

As Gaza redevelops and the Palestinian Authority enacts reforms, a “credible pathway” toward Palestinian self-determination and statehood will emerge. The US will facilitate dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians “for peaceful and prosperous co-existence.”

Now, the Rest of the News

There are many moving parts — and the plan will work only if everything that can go right, does go right. That’s an overly optimistic premise for any Middle East peace initiative.

To start with, Israel receives almost all its key demands: hostage release, Hamas disarmament, removal of Hamas as a governing force, and a security buffer zone in Gaza. Its withdrawal will depend on Hamas’s compliance. Hamas, by contrast, gains little. Hostages have been its main leverage; civilian casualties and humanitarian suffering have been its most potent weapon in the campaign to delegitimise Israel globally.

Polls suggest Hamas remains highly popular in both Gaza and the West Bank. Trump has threatened to give Israel a free hand if Hamas rejects his plan. For an ideology that glorifies martyrdom, Hamas leaders may prefer to “die on their feet rather than live on their knees.”

Conversely, the deal might be torpedoed by Netanyahu’s hawkish coalition partners, who demand a permanent security presence in Gaza, annexation of the West Bank, and no release or amnesty for prisoners. Opposition parties seeking an end to the war might, however, step in to keep Netanyahu in power.

Both Hamas and Israel may feel pressured to accept the plan to avoid Trump’s wrath, but both have a long record of sabotaging agreements — arguing endlessly over implementation details and blaming each other. The region has never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

Expecting the Palestinian Authority, led by a president now in the third decade of a four-year term, to suddenly transform into a corruption-free model of efficiency is a triumph of hope over experience.

Arab governments were brought on board by Trump’s rejection of Israeli annexation plans. When Israel struck targets on Qatari soil, Doha discovered the limits of “playing all sides” — hosting Hamas leaders, a US base, and mediating between them. This helped push them toward agreement. But how long can Arab regimes resist popular attachment to the Palestinian cause?

Finally, Tony Blair’s inclusion on the Peace Board is widely criticised. Discredited for his role in the 2003 Iraq War, Blair’s association with any Middle East peace effort seems paradoxical. Putting “Tony Blair” and “peace” in the same sentence has as much chance of harmony as Hamas and a Netanyahu government coexisting in peace.

We can only conclude that Trump underestimates just how globally toxic the Blair brand remains.

Ramesh Thakur, a former UN Assistant Secretary-General, is Emeritus Professor at the Australian National University and Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He is also a former Senior Research Fellow at the Toda Peace Institute and editor of The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Transformational Reframing of the Global Nuclear Order.